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AFRICAN POLYGAMY: PAST AND PRESENT
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. Polygamy is common in Africa, and is blamed for negative outcomes. I use
DHS data to test nine hypotheses about its prevalence and decline. First, historical in-
equality better predicts polygamy today than current inequality. Second, greater female
involvement in agriculture reduces polygamy. Third, the slave trade predicts polygamy,
but not robustly. Fourth, modern female education does not reduce polygamy. Colo-
nial schooling does. Fifth, economic growth is weakly correlated with polygamy. Sixth
and seventh, rainfall shocks and war increase polygamy, though their effects are small.
Eighth, polygamy varies smoothly over borders, national bans notwithstanding. Finally,
falling child mortality has reduced polygamy.
[THIS IS AN EARLY DRAFT PREPARED FOR THE LSE ECONOMIC HISTORY SEMINAR.
THE DATA ARE NOT YET FULLY CLEANED. METHODS AND RESULTS MAY CHANGE.]
1. INTRODUCTION
Polygamy remains common in much of Africa.1 In several sub-Saharan countries,
more than 10% of married women are in a polygamous union (Tertilt, 2005). Between
Senegal and Tanzania stretches a “polygamy belt” in which it is common to find that
more than one third of married women are polygamous (Jacoby, 1995). Polygamy has
been cited as a possible cause of Africa’s low savings rates (Tertilt, 2005), high incidence
of HIV (Brahmbhatt et al., 2002), high levels of child mortality (Strassmann, 1997), and
of female depression (Adewuya et al., 2007).
This is despite a striking decline in the prevalence of polygamy in Africa over the last
half century. Of the nearly half a million women included in the data for this study,
roughly 40% who first married in 1970 share their husband today, while for women who
married in 2005, that number is closer to 15%. In Benin, more than 60% of women in
the sample who were married in 1970 were polygamists, while in 2000 this figure was
under 40%. This is also true of Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Senegal. In Cameroon and the
Ivory Coast, the decline has been from over 40% to under 20%. Several other countries
in the data have experienced similar changes in their marriage institutions. This is an
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evolution of marriage markets as rapid and dramatic as the rise in divorce in the United
States between 1960 and 1980.
In this paper, I use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) on women
from 34 countries to test nine hypotheses about the prevalence and decline of polygamy
in sub-Saharan Africa. Three of these relate to the distribution of polygamy over space.
First, economists since Becker (1974) have linked polygamy to inequality between men.
I am not able to find any correlation between wealth or occupational inequality recorded
in the DHS and the probability that a woman is polygamous. By contrast, I find that his-
torical indicators of inequality on the eve of colonial rule taken from the Ethnographic
Atlas predict polygamy today. Similarly, geographic predictors of inequality that have
been used in other studies also predict the existence of polygamy in the present. Second,
Jacoby (1995) has linked the demand for wives in the Ivory Coast to the productivity of
women in agriculture. I find, by contrast, that polygamy is least common in those parts
of Africa where women have historically been most important in agriculture. Third, I
confirm the result of Dalton and Leung (2011); greater slave trade exposure does pre-
dict polygamy today. My approach differs from theirs in several ways – I take women as
the unit of observation rather than men, I include Angola (a low-polygamy country that
was the hardest hit by the Atlantic slave trade), and I take locations rather than ethnic
groups as the unit of treatment. I show, however, that the result is not robust, because
identification depends on comparing Western Africa to the rest of the continent.
Five of these hypotheses relate to changes in polygamy rates over time. First, I repli-
cate two natural experiments that have increased female education in Nigeria (Osili and
Long, 2008) and Zimbabwe (Agu¨ero and Ramachandran, 2010), and find no causal effect
of schooling on polygamy. Using colonial data from Huillery (2009) and Nunn (2009),
I show that schooling investments decades ago do predict lower polygamy rates today.
Second, I use instrumental variables to find an effect of economic growth on the decline
in polygamy, though this is not robust result and the magnitude is small. Third, I find
that local economic shocks do predict polygamy; women within a survey cluster who
received bad rainfall draws in their prime marriageable years are more likely to marry
a polygamist. Fourth, war acts like a bad rainfall shock at the local level, increasing the
prevalence of polygamy. Both of these effects, however, are small in magnitude. Fifth,
I use a regression discontinuity design to test whether national bans and other policies
have played any role in the decline of African polygamy. With a few notable exceptions,
I find that they generally have not. Sixth, I use national-level differences in differences
and a malaria eradication program in Uganda to test for an effect of falling child mortal-
ity. The magnitudes I find are large enough to explain much of the decline in polygamy
across sub-Saharan Africa.
Because of this diversity of tests, I contribute to a wide range of literatures. The
two most general literatures concern the economics of institutions and the econom-
ics of marriage. A global literature has confirmed the importance of institutions such
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as land rights (Goldstein and Udry, 2008), slavery (Sacerdote, 2005), pre-colonial states
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011a), and colonial legal forms (La Porta et al., 1997)
for development. Empirical studies have linked these institutions to biogeographical
endowments, such as settler mortality (Acemoglu et al., 2001), suitability for specific
crops (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997), ecological diversity (Fenske, 2010), and popula-
tion density (Acemoglu et al., 2002). By demonstrating that geographic determinants
of inequality and the gender division of labor continue to predict the institution of
polygamy today, I add to our understanding of how geography shapes institutions. Fur-
ther, it has been suggested that institutions adapt to the needs of the market (Burness
and Quirk, 1979; Greif, 1993). I show here that polygamy rates are responsive to eco-
nomic shocks.
Economists since at least Becker (1973) have been interested in the operation of mar-
riage markets. Much of this literature has focused on marital institutions in the de-
veloping world. These contributions have focused on the implications of marital ar-
rangements for outcomes such as income smoothing (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), fe-
male schooling (Field and Ambrus, 2008), sex selection (Sen, 1990), and child health
(Bharadwaj and Nelson, 2010). I uncover a dramatic transition in African marriage mar-
kets, and assess some of the most plausible hypotheses for this change. I also touch
on a variety of other literatures, including the importance of inequality for economic
development (Easterly, 2007; Putterman and Weil, 2010), the economic implications of
the gender division of labor (Alesina et al., 2011; Qian, 2008), the long run impacts of
the slave trade (Nunn, 2008), the microeconomic effects of war (Annan and Blattman,
2010; Blattman and Miguel, 2010), the ability of poor households to cope with economic
shocks (Townsend, 1994), and the weak capacity of African states (Collier and Gunning,
1999).
I do not follow a standard outline in this paper, because I am testing several hypothe-
ses and using multiple estimation strategies and sources of data. The base data for this
study come from the DHS, and I describe these when I first use them in section 2. I ex-
plain the other sources of data briefly as I introduce them, leaving the bulk of the data
description for appendix A. In section 2, I use the cross-sectional nature of the DHS
data to test the three hypotheses that predict the incidence of polygyny across space. In
section 3, I use the panel nature of the DHS to test the five hypotheses that explain the
incidence of polygyny over time.
2. POLYGAMY ACROSS SPACE
I depict the distribution of polygamy over space in Africa in Figure 1. Each point in the
figure is a married woman in the DHS data for sub-Saharan Africa. Blue dots indicate
polygamists. As is clear from the figure, polygamy is concentrated in West Africa, though
a high-intensity belt stretches through to Tanzania. In this section, I test three theories
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FIGURE 1. Polygamy in Africa
This figure plots polygamy for the 308,667 women in the sample that have latitude and longitude coor-
dinates. A blue dot indicates polygamy, and a grey dot indicates monogamy.
that attempt to explain this distribution: inequality, female labor productivity, and the
slave trade.
2.1. Inequality.
2.1.1. Hypothesis. The most familiar explanation of polygamy for economists is that it is
a due to inequality between men. An early proponent of this view is Becker (1974), who
argues that differences in male productivity can make polygamy efficient. Total output
can be raised by giving a more productive man a second wife than by giving her to a “less
able” man. Similarly, Bergstrom (1994) models polygamy as a consequence of inequality
in male endowments of both wealth and of sisters that can be traded for wives. This
effect is tempered, however, by the self-interest of the elite; Lagerlo¨f (2010) suggests that
a self-interested ruler may impose monogamy to prevent his own overthrow by lesser
men deprived of wives.
2.1.2. Tests. I use three specifications to test for the the importance of inequality for
polygamy. First I use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate
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polygamousi = βinequalityi + x
′
iγ + δj + i.
Here, polygamousi is an indicator for whether woman i is in a polygamous marriage.
inequalityi is a measure of inequality, here collected at either the survey cluster (roughly
village) or region level. xi is a vector of other controls, some collected at the individ-
ual level, and some at a cluster, region or other level. xi includes a constant. δj is a
country-round fixed effect, which is only used in certain specifications. i is error. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the level at which inequalityi varies. In practice, I use three
measures of contemporary inequality – the coefficient of variation of household wealth,
the gini coefficient of household wealth, and the ratio of partners in high-skilled occu-
pations to those in low-skilled occupations. I compute each of these at both the cluster
and region levels.
The variables that are collected differ across the 90 DHS data sets that are compiled
together here, and so I use only three individual-level controls in xi in order to conserve
observations. These are: year of birth, year of birth squared, and a dummy for urban res-
idence. I include several geographic controls in xi, which are intended to capture other
environmental determinants of polygamy that may be correlated with my variables of
interest. These are: absolute latitude; suitability for wheat, maize, cereals, roots/tubers,
pulses, sugar, oil, cotton, and rain-fed agriculture; suitability for malaria; ruggedness;
elevation; distance to the coast, and; dummies for ecological zone (woodland, forest,
mosaic, cropland, intensive cropland, wetland, desert, water/coastal fringe, or urban).
The specific crops in this list are chosen by data availability. In many of the countries
studied, they are economically important, accounting in the year 2000 for 83% of the
value of crop production in Zambia, 91% in Namibia, and 72% in Burkina Faso, for
example (faostat.fao.org). Each of these are measured at the level of the survey clus-
ter. Because the wealth indices from the raw data that I use to measure inequality here
are normalized for each country-round, country-round fixed effects are included when
these are used to construct the dependent variables.
Each of the measures of contemporary inequality may be correlated with i. I take
two approaches for dealing with this. First, I replace inequalityl with historical mea-
sures describing a woman’s ethnic group on the eve of colonial rule. These are: historic
class stratification, historic slavery, and historic access to trade routes. Second, I replace
inequalityl with geographic variables that have been used in other studies as predictors
of inequality. These are the log ratio of wheat to sugar suitability (Easterly, 2007) and
unequal agricultural endowments (Michalopoulos et al., 2010). I have attempted to use
these geographic measures as instruments for the contemporary and historical inequal-
ity measures, but the first stage F statistics are generally too weak to permit this.2
2I have also tested whether a quadratic function of historic population density matters, following Baker
et al. (2008), where inequality is highest at intermediate population densities. There does appear to be a
statistically significant inverse-U pattern (not reported). I do not interpret this as inequality, however, and
so exclude it from the analysis. This measure can also be interpreted in light of the “land abundance” view
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Other approaches to predicting inequality, such as unequal landholding (Dutt and
Mitra, 2008) or inequality in immigrants’ home countries (Putterman and Weil, 2010),
cannot be applied to these data. None of these measures are perfect, as each one might
be correlated with other determinants of polygamy. A cleaner identification strategy
would be to use changes over time in relative prices of “plantation” and “smallholder”
crops (Galor et al., 2009). The distinction between these crops, however, is not the same
in Africa as in the Americas. Many of the crops for which I have suitability data are not
typically exported. Thus, I can only offer a guarded interpretation of the results – I find
that historical patterns of inequality or the unobservable factors associated with them
predict polygamy today. History matters.
2.1.3. Data. Each of these data sources are described in more detail in appendix A.
Polygamy is taken by using the “individual recode” section from 90 DHS surveys con-
ducted between 1986 and 2009, collected from 34 sub-Saharan countries. 494,157 ob-
servations are available in which a woman’s polygamy status, year of birth, and urban
residence are known. Of these, data are available on the latitude and longitude of the
woman’s survey cluster for 308,667 respondents. Absolute latitude is computed from
these data. Distance to the coast is also computed directly using these coordinates.
Two other variables from the DHS data are used to measure inequality. The first is
the wealth index. This is a factor score computed separately for every survey round,
based on ownership of durable goods. I compute both coefficients of variation and gini
coefficients from these data. The second variable used is the respondent’s partner’s oc-
cupation. I classified the responses from the raw into fourteen categories. Of these
fourteen, I classified agricultural laborer, farmer, unskilled manual, household, and do-
mestic as low skilled, army, clerical, sales, services, skilled manual, student and appli-
cant as medium-skilled, and professional, technical and managerial as high-skilled. Not
working, unknown, and other (X% of the sample for which this question is asked) were
left unclassified.
Geographic data are joined to these coordinates using raster data collected from sev-
eral sources. Each survey cluster is assigned the value of the nearest raster point. Vari-
ables taken from the FAO-GAEZ project are suitability for specific crops, suitability for
rain-fed agriculture, and ecological zone. The suitability measures are all scores be-
tween 0 and 7. The measure of elevation is an index that ranges from 0 to 255, taken from
the NACIS. Suitability for malaria is taken from the Malaria Atlas Project, and ranges
of African history (Austin, 2008; Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe, 1995). This view, as stated by Goody (1976), holds
that polygyny exists where allocating land to additional wives is less costly but their labor is valuable. For
this exercise, “historic population density” is population density in 1960, reported by the United Nations
Environment Programme. Following (Baker et al., 2008), I include the log of one plus this density and its
square as regressors. The result is consistent with an amended land abundance view of African history,
in which some population density is a prerequisite for polygamy, but in which high densities increase the
value of land relative to wives.
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TABLE 1. Inequality and polygamy
[Table 1 here]
from 0 to 1. The ruggedness data are the Terrain Ruggedness Index used by Nunn and
Puga (2011), which range from 0 to 1,368,318 in the data here.
Historic class stratification and historic slavery are taken from the Ethnographic Atlas.
This database records institutions at the ethnicity level for 1,267 societies from around
the world at the time of European contact. These are joined to the DHS data using the
name of the respondent’s ethnic group. Ethnicity is only reported for a sub-sample of
the data, some of which contain uninformative responses such as “other” or “African.”
Not all ethnic groups in Africa have entries in the Ethnographic Atlas. Slightly more than
half the sample could be joined by this method. Historic class stratification is a score
between 1 and 5 describing the degree to which class differences were present before
colonial rule. Slavery, similarly, is an index between 1 and 4 measuring the pre-colonial
use of slaves. Historic access to trade routes is distance from the survey cluster to a trade
route existing in 600 AD, as mapped by Brice and Kennedy (2001) and used previously
by Michalopoulos et al. (2010). This variable is included because taxation of trade was a
major source of income for elites in pre-colonial Africa (e.g. Bates (1987)).
There are two predictors of inequality used. The log ratio of wheat to sugar suitability
is computed directly from the FAO data, described above. Unequal agricultural endow-
ments are measured in two ways – the coefficient of variation of suitability for rain-fed
agriculture (described above) for the survey clusters within each region, and the coef-
ficient of variation of constraints on rain-fed agriculture, for the survey clusters within
each region. The constraints variable is, like the FAO suitability measures, an index be-
tween 1 and 7. It measures the combined soil, climate, and terrain slope constraints on
rain-fed agriculture.
2.1.4. Results. Results of these tests are reported in Table 1. It is clear that there is no
positive relationship between any of the measures of present-day inequality and the
probability that a woman is polygamous, except when the cluster-level coefficient of
variation of wealth is introduced without other controls. Even in this case, the point es-
timate is very small. The estimated coefficients for the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled
occupations also run counter to the inequality hypothesis, as these coefficients are usu-
ally negative. This robust negative correlation at the cluster level survives inclusion of
both country-round and region-round fixed effects (not reported).
What of historic inequality? Here, the results are quite different. Historic class strati-
fication, historic slavery, and historic access to trade routes all strongly predict the pres-
ence of polygamy today. Binary indicators of class stratification and slavery give similar
results. The class stratification results are robust to including country-round or region-
round fixed effects (not reported). The slavery and trade route results are significant
with region-round fixed effects, but not country-round fixed effects (not reported).
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Because the effect of historical trade routes may not work through the wealth of elites,
but instead through the influence of Islam, I re-estimate this specification, with con-
trols, a) including an indicator for whether the woman is Muslim, b) excluding country-
rounds where more than 25% of the population is Muslim, and c) excluding country-
rounds where more than 10% of the sample is Muslim. Though this diminishes the co-
efficient (and the sample), it remains significant. This should not be too surprising:
Muslims and followers of traditional African religions have similar levels of polygamy in
the data – polygamy is not an Islamic import.
What of the determinants of inequality? Here too, the results suggest that the very
long-term determinants of inequality matter. The Easterly (2007) instrument, in which
a greater wheat-sugar ratio should reduce inequality, predicts lower levels of polygamy.
Similarly, greater regional differences in land quality predict higher levels of polygamy.
Each of these results are robust to the inclusion of country-round fixed effects, though
the log wheat sugar ratio is insignificant with region-round fixed effects (not shown).
The magnitudes of the significant historical effects vary. The coefficient magnitudes
imply that a one standard deviation change in historical class stratification would re-
duce polygamy by a bit more than 1 percentage point. For slavery and historic trade
routes, the comparable effects are roughly 8 points and 7 points, respectively. Each of
these are a sizable effect, but none is large enough to explain a substantial fraction of
the variance in polygamy. A one standard deviation movements in the log wheat-sugar
ratio is associated with a more than 7 percentage point reduction in polygamy rates,
while the comparable effect for variation in land quality is a bit larger than 1 percentage
point. Again, these are non-trivial changes relative to the mean rate of polygamy in the
sample (28%), but they do little to explain the total variance.
2.2. Female productivity.
2.2.1. Hypothesis. That polygamy might be a consequence of female productivity in
agriculture is also a familiar hypothesis. Jacoby (1995), for example, shows that the de-
mand for wives is highest in those parts of the Ivory Coast where female productivity in
agriculture is highest. In particular, he finds positive effects of cluster-level cultivation
of yams/sweet potatoes, rice, plantains/bananas, and peanuts on female labor produc-
tivity. He finds a negative effect for maize, and insignificant effects of coffee, cassava,
cotton, vegetables, and “other.” He finds that female labor productivity predicted by
these crops increases the demand for wives. He takes inspiration from Boserup (1970),
who links polygamy to the sexual division of labor in hoe agriculture; women in a bush
fallow system play a greater role in agriculture than elsewhere.
2.2.2. Tests. Unlike Jacoby (1995), I have a data-set that spans most of sub-Saharan
Africa, and exogenous measures of the suitability of the land for cultivating specific
crops. In addition, I have a measure of the historic importance of women in agriculture.
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TABLE 2. Female productivity and polygamy
[Table 2 here]
I estimate three specifications to test for the importance of female productivity. Before
testing whether the suitability for any particular crop matters, I use OLS to estimate
polygamousi = βland qualityi + x
′
iγ + i.
Here, land qualityi is one of two proxies for land quality. The first is the direct measure
of suitability for rain-fed agriculture described in section 2.1. The second is the measure
of agricultural constraints, also described in that section. The dependent variable and
controls are as they were in section 2.1, except that suitability for rain-fed agriculture is
no longer in xi, but instead reported directly. This specification does not test for female
productivity in particular, but rather for the importance of overall agricultural produc-
tivity.
Second, I use OLS to estimate:
polygamousi =
C∑
c=1
βcsuitability for crop ci + x
′
iγ + i.
The suitability measures for each crop are the measures described in section 2.1, and
are available for wheat, maize, cereals, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, oil crops, and cotton.
I will contrast the coefficients on these with the findings of Jacoby (1995). The other
variables are unchanged, except that these suitability measures are no longer in xi, but
instead reported directly.
Third, I use both OLS and IV to estimate:
polygamousi = βhistoric female agriculturei + x
′
iγ + i.
The measure of historic female agriculture is described below. The excluded instru-
ments I use are the suitability measures for the specific crops. The other controls are
unchanged.
2.2.3. Data. The data used here have already been outlined in section 2.1, with one
exception. Historic female agriculture is taken from the taken from the Ethnographic
Atlas, and like the class stratification and slavery variables described in that section,
it is merged to the DHS data using the name of the respondent’s ethnic group. This
variable assigns each ethnic group a score between 1 and 5 indicating the degree to
which female labor was dominant relative to male labor in agriculture, roughly at the
time of European contact.
2.2.4. Results. The results, in Table 2, are inconsistent with those of Jacoby (1995). While
the constraints measure of land quality suggests that polygamy exists where agriculture
in general is more productive, the measure of suitability for rain-fed agriculture does
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not give the same result. More directly, the variables that predict female productivity in
his sample do not predict polygamy here. Roots and tubers (the equivalent of yams and
sweet potatoes) have a negative and non-robust coefficient. His negative coefficient
on maize is not found in these data. Cotton has a positive and significant, rather than
insignificant effect.
Critically, the historical importance of women in agriculture is negatively correlated
with polygamy. A cursory glance at Figure 1 suggests that this should not be a surprise.
Polygamy is concentrated in the sahel and the soudan, where women have been less im-
portant in agriculture than in the more tropical parts of Africa. This is a moderately large
effect: a one standard deviation increase in female importance predicts a more than
5 percentage point reduction in polygamy. This result also survives the use of instru-
mental variables. An over-identification test suggests that the full vector of suitability
controls cannot be excluded from the polygamy equation, and so only the suitability for
wheat (the strongest predictor) is used as an instrument. The OLS results are robust to
the inclusion of country-round or region-round fixed effects, but the IV results are not
(not reported). Despite this, the general pattern here is unmistakeable – the hypoth-
esis that female productivity in agriculture determines polygamy cannot explain why
polygamy is most prevalent in those parts of Africa where female labor in agriculture
has historically been least important.
2.3. The slave trade.
2.3.1. Hypothesis. That the slave trade may have increased polygamy in Africa is an old
argument – see Thornton (1983). This may have operated through several mechanisms.
First, the Atlantic slave trade removed more men than women from the affected areas of
the continent. Second, the slave trade increased inequality between those who profited
from the trade and those who suffered from it. Third, by creating movable wealth in the
form of slaves and imported monies, the slave trade may have facilitated a transition
from matrilocal to patrilocal marriage, allowing for non-sororal polygamy (Schneider,
1981). Whatley and Gillezeau (2010) have shown that there is a correlation between
slaves taken from points along the coast and the degree of polygamy among coastal
groups recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. Recently, Dalton and Leung (2011) have used
DHS data to find a correlation that is robust to the instrumental variables strategy used
by Nunn (2008) – predicting slave exports using distance from new world ports. I con-
firm their result using different methods. They use a man’s number of wives as a depen-
dent variable, while I take women as the unit of observation. They match DHS data to
the ethnicity-level slave trade estimates in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) using respon-
dents’ ethnic groups. I do this and use geographic coordinates to make an alternative
matching to these slave estimates. Critically, neither the individual nor male recodes of
the DHS data provide polygamy data for Angola. Angola exported more slaves than any
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TABLE 3. The slave trade and polygamy
[Table 3 here]
other African country, but has low polygamy rates today. Using the household recode
data to add Angola to the analysis does not change the result.
2.3.2. Tests. Using the DHS individual recodes, I use OLS and IV to estimate:
polygamousi = βSlave trade exposurei + x
′
iγ + i.
The variable polygamous and the controls in xi are unchanged from section 2.1. I
use two estimates of Slave trade exposurei. First, I match the women in the sample to
the ethnicity-level slave trade estimates in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) using self-
reported ethnicities. Second, because the estimates in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
are reported in a map of ethnic groups, I use respondents’ geographic coordinates to
join them to these measures of slave trade intensity over space. Following Dalton and
Leung (2011), I use the log of (one plus) Atlantic slave trade exports normalized by area
to measure slave trade exposure. Standard errors are clustered at the ethnic-group level.
I also instrument for slave exports using distance of the survey cluster from the closest
slave port in the Americas. To demonstrate that the significant effects found below are
contingent on a comparison of West Africa and the rest of the continent, I also include
longitude in xi and re-estimate this regression on the sub-sample of West African coun-
tries.3
Because my main data source and that of Dalton and Leung (2011) both exclude An-
gola (since the polygamy question was not asked), I assemble an alternative data series
using the “household recode” portion of the DHS survey. Here, the unit of observation
is the household, and I code each household as polygamous if there is more than one
woman listed in the household roster who is stated to be the wife of the household head.
I discard households with no wives. These data do not include information on year of
birth, urban status, or ethnicity, and so I am only able to estimate the main equation
with geographic controls. Standard errors are again clustered at the ethnic group level,
matched by geographic coordinates.
2.3.3. Data. All variables used here have been previously described except for exposure
to the slave trade, which has been outlined above.
2.3.4. Results. Results are in Table 3. I find a positive correlation between the slave
trade and polygamy rates today in the OLS and IV estimates, using both individual-
level and household-level data and matching respondents to treatment by location. In
the individual-level OLS, a one standard deviation change in slave exports predicts a
roughly 2 percentage point increase in polygamy; in the IV results the effect is more
3Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Togo.
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than 15 times as large. Matches by ethnicity give positive but insignificant coefficients.
The IV coefficients are much larger than the OLS, which is consistent with more severe
measurement error in slave exports than in geographic location. However, this result
depends on the broad comparison of West Africa with the rest of the continent. Coun-
try fixed effects, controlling for longitude, and separately estimating the effects using
only the West African sub-sample do not yield statistically significant results (latter two
not reported).
2.4. Summary. So far, then, I have found no evidence that modern-day inequality pre-
dicts polygamy, but I have shown that modern day polygamy is strongly correlated with
both historic inequality and with geographic variables that predict it. I have shown that,
notwithstanding the results of Jacoby (1995), the distribution of polygamy across sub-
Saharan Africa is not consistent with the claim that it is determined by the importance
or productivity of women in agriculture. I have confirmed the results of Dalton and
Leung (2011), that the distribution of slavery in Africa is correlated with the impact of
the transatlantic slave trade, but I have also shown that this result is more robust when
treatment is measured spatially, rather than by ethnic group, and is dependent on a
comparison of West Africa with the rest of the continent.
3. POLYGAMY OVER TIME
The decline in polygamy rates in Africa over the past few decades is striking. Figure
2 captures one example, plotting the fraction of women in the sample who are polyg-
amous against their year of birth for the Ivory Coast. Women born in the 1980s were
much less likely to marry into a polygamist union than women born in the 1940s or
1950s. In appendix B, I present similar graphs for all the countries in the sample. It is
clear from these pictures that the decline has not been confined to one region of Africa,
to high polygamy countries, to more urban countries, or to those that have been more
successful at achieving growth and stability. Madagascar and South Africa are the only
countries in the sample where there has not been a clear decline since 1970. In this
section, I address six possible explanations of these changes over time – women’s edu-
cation, economic growth, economic shocks, war, national laws, and child mortality.
3.1. Female education.
3.1.1. Hypothesis. It is intuitive that empowering women through education may en-
courage them to avoid polygamous marriage. Over and above this effect, Gould et al.
(2008) suggest that the quantity-quality tradeoff links female education to polygamy. If
child quality matters, a rich man may prefer to spend his money on purchasing one ed-
ucated wife, rather than several uneducated ones. The expansion of female schooling
from independence until the 1980s was dramatic across much of Africa (Schultz, 1999).
Has this played a role in the decline of polygamy?
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FIGURE 2. Polygamy in the Ivory Coast by year of birth
This figure plots the average polygamy status of Ivoirian women in the sample against their year of birth.
3.1.2. Tests. I begin by using OLS to estimate:
polygamousi = βyears of schoolingi + x
′
iγ + δj + i.
xi contains the standard individual and geographic controls outlined in section 2.1.
Depending on the specification, δj denotes country-round, region-round, or cluster-
round fixed effects. This regression does not test for an impact of a woman’s years of
schooling on polygamy, but only confirms there is a strong correlation in the data worth
investigating further. To test for a causal impact of educating women, I replicate two
natural experiments and two historical exercises.
First, I replicate the Nigerian natural experiment of Osili and Long (2008) as closely
as possible. From 1976 to 1981, the Nigerian government engaged in a school-building
program that only affected certain states. Osili and Long (2008) use this to test whether
female schooling reduces fertility. I follow their approach, and use OLS to estimate:
years of educationi = βBorn 1970-75 X Intensityi
+ αIntensityi + λBorn 1970-75 + x
′
iγ + i
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The controls in xi are year of birth, and dummies for the three largest Nigerian ethnic
groups (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo), and the major religions (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian, and traditional). The sample includes only women born between 1956-
61 and 1970-75. This tests whether the school-building program had a differential effect
on the women young enough to exposed to it as children in the affected states. The
treatment effect is the coefficient β. Since the three measures of Intensityi (described
below) differ only at the level of states in 1976, standard errors are also clustered at this
level. I then estimate the same equation with polygamy as an outcome.
Second, I replicate the Zimbabwean natural experiment of Agu¨ero and Ramachan-
dran (2010) as closely as possible. On independence, Zimbabwe dramatically increased
access to secondary schooling. There was a discontinuous increase in educational at-
tainment for students who were 14 years old in 1980. Agu¨ero and Ramachandran (2010)
use this break to test for intergenerational effects of this education shock. Following
their approach, I use OLS to estimate:
years of educationi = βAge 14 or below in 1980i + αAge in 1980i
+ λ(14-Age in 1980) X (Age 14 or below in 1980) + i
There are no additional controls and, following Agu¨ero and Ramachandran (2010),
robust standard errors are used. The “full” sample includes women aged 6 to 22 in 1980,
and the “short” sample includes women aged 10 to 20. Here β measures the program’s
discontinuous effect on women aged 14 in 1980. I then estimate this equation with OLS
using polygamy as an outcome.
Third, I replicate the historical approach of Huillery (2009) as closely as possible. In
particular, I use OLS to estimate:
polygamyi = βTeachers per capita, 1910-1928i + x
′
iγ + i
Here, Teachers per capita, 1910-1928 measures the average number of teachers per
capita at the district (cercle) level in colonial French West Africa. Because population
is not available every year, the denominator is always population in 1925. xi always
contains the respondent’s year of birth, year squared, and an urban dummy. Following
Huillery (2009), I include measures of the attractiveness the district to the French, con-
ditions of its conquest, pre-colonial conditions, and geographic variables in xi, though
not all at once. Standard errors are clustered by 1925 district.
Fourth, I follow an exercise similar to Nunn (2010), and test whether the presence of
a colonial mission lowers polygamy rates today. I use OLS to estimate:
polygamyi = βDistance from a mission in 1924i + x
′
iγ + δj + i
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Here Distance from a mission in 1924i measures distance from a catholic or protes-
tant mission in 1924. Since most colonial education was conducted through missions,
this will capture the combined effects of schooling and religious evangelism. Depend-
ing in the specification, δj indicates country-round or region-round fixed effects.
Instruments are not available for either teachers in colonial French West Africa, or
missions in Africa as a whole. It is not possible, then, to interpret these estimates as
strictly causal; it may be that colonial-era schooling does not matter, but rather the un-
observable characteristics of certain places determined both outcomes. Despite this
weakness, the significant estimates reported below are consistent with the importance
of long-run factors in contemporary polygamy.
3.1.3. Data. The variable years of schoolingi is readily available in the raw DHS data. For
the replication of Osili and Long (2008), three measures of program intensity are taken
directly from the text of their paper – a dummy variable for a “high intensity” state,
school-building funds in 1976 divided by the 1953 census population estimates, and
school-building funds normalized by 1976 population projections based on the (unre-
liable) 1963 census. Survey clusters were matched to the old states using their latitude
and longitude coordinates. Since the 1999 DHS data for Nigeria do not have geographic
data, this wave of the DHS is not used. The age variables needed to replicate Agu¨ero and
Ramachandran (2010) are easily computed from the DHS.
The data used to replicate Huillery (2009) are taken from her website. The only control
for attractiveness of the district to the French is trade taxes per capita in 1914. Condi-
tions of conquest are year of conquest, duration of resistance and its square, and indem-
nities charged. Pre-colonial controls are a dummy for a centralized political power, a
European trade counter and 1910 population density. Geographic controls are latitude,
longitude, altitude, dummies for the river and coast, and average rainfall from 1915 to
1975. The data on missions, used by Nunn (2010), are originally contained in Roome
(1924). Distance to these missions is measured from the respondent’s survey cluster.
3.1.4. Results. The hypothesis is well motivated. There is a strong negative correlation
between polygamy and a woman’s years of education. This holds conditional on con-
trols, country-round fixed effects, region-round fixed effects, and cluster-round fixed
effects. It is of a reasonable magnitude, suggesting that an extra year of schooling, in the
most conservative specification, is correlated with a slightly less than 1 percentage point
reduction in the probability of polygamy. Were this to be taken as a causal elasticity, it
could not, however, explain a substantial portion of the decline in polygamy. African
women in the sample have gained less than half a year of schooling per decade, while
polygamy rates in the sample have been falling at more than 5 percentage points every
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ten years.4 While I am able to find program effects on female schooling that were uncov-
ered by Osili and Long (2008) and Agu¨ero and Ramachandran (2010), neither of these
predict a discontinuous drop in polygamy rates. In Nigeria, the coefficient estimate is
positive, while in Zimbabwe it is both small and insignificant.
Contrary to this, I do find a negative effect of schooling in colonial French West Africa
on polygamy today. Though pre-colonial controls make this effect insignificant, the fact
that the coefficient grows larger suggests this is the result of multi-collinearity. The mag-
nitude suggests that a one standard deviation change in colonial education reduces
polygamy by roughly 1 percentage point. Like Nunn (2010), I do find that distance
from either a Catholic or a Protestant mission reduces access to education, even in
the present. Interestingly, while I find that proximity to a Catholic mission reduces
polygamy today, the similar effect of distance from a protestant mission disappears
once country-round or region-round fixed effects are added. Adding a control for wether
the respondent is Muslim dramatically reduces the estimated coefficients before country-
round or region-round fixed effects are added; once these are included, controlling for
whether the respondent is Muslim has almost no effect on the estimated impact of mis-
sions (not reported). A one standard deviation change in access to a Catholic mission
reduces polygamy by roughly 3 percentage points. This is consistent with the findings
in Nunn (2009) that Catholic missions imparted not only education, but also ideological
views about the appropriate role for women in African society. Together, these results
suggest that education of women only appears to reduce polygamy rates over the very
long term, and in conjunction with other interventions.
3.2. Economic growth.
3.2.1. Hypothesis. The decline of polygamy in Africa has coincided with a period of fitful
economic growth. Are the two related?
3.2.2. Tests. To test this hypothesis, I use OLS and IV to estimate:
polygamyi = βGDP per capita before marriagei + x
′
iγ + δj + ηt + i
Polygamy and the set of controls are as in section 2.1, except that I now include coun-
try (δj) and year (ηt) fixed effects in xi. I use two measures of GDP per capita before
marriage – log GDP per capita in the year a woman is married, and log GDP per capita
averaged over her early adolescence, i.e. the years she is aged 12 to 16. Standard errors
are clustered by country× year of marriage in the first specification, and country× year
of birth in the second. Because year of marriage may be endogenous, and measuring
GDP during early adolescence is a crude attempt to deal with this, I also reshape the
data into an artificial panel. Here, each woman is observed between the ages of 12 and
4These are the coefficients of (unreported) bivariate regressions for the pooled sample.
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25, and exits on marriage or on turning 26. I estimate the same equation as above, ex-
cept that the dependent variable is now an indicator for having married polygamously
in a given year. I include fixed effects for age, country, and year, excluding other controls.
Standard errors are now clustered by country× year.
To test for a causal relationship, I instrument for country-level GDP per capita using
the country-level FAO rainfall estimates used by Miguel et al. (2004), both in the panel
and cross section. These are taken by year, or averaged over early adolescence as appro-
priate. I do not seek to interpret this correlation, even if it is causal; GDP is too coarse
an indicator to explain any underlying mechanism by which economic growth eroded
polygamy.
3.2.3. Data. The only new data introduced here cover GDP per capita and rainfall. GDP
per capita is taken from the World Development Indicators. Rainfall data used to instru-
ment national level GDP are taken from the Miguel et al. (2004) data set. These capture
average rainfall, recorded by the FAO, over the geographic points in the entire country
during that year. FAO estimates are used because these extend the furthest back in time
of any of the three data series used in that paper.
3.2.4. Results. The results, given in Table 5, are mixed. While greater GDP per capita in
the year a woman is married predicts a lower probability that she marries a polygamist,
the results are less robust when GDP per capita is averaged over her early adolescence.
The results here do not survive the inclusion of year and country fixed effects alongside
controls, though this insignificance is marginal. The instrument has no power to pre-
dict GDP in this specification. Without controls but with fixed effects (not reported), the
results remain significant. Similarly, the results in the artificial panels do not survive the
inclusion of age, year and country fixed effects. though the estimated coefficient grows
more negative in the IV results. The results for year of marriage, then, are suggestive of
only a weak link between GDP per capita and polygamy. Further, the estimated coeffi-
cients are very small; in the log specification, a 100% increase in GDP per capita would
reduce polygamy by roughly 2 percentage points in the unconditional OLS specifica-
tions. While economic growth over the past few decades has been cyclical and uneven
across the continent, most countries in the sample have seen a steady, uninterrupted
decline in polygamy.
3.3. Economic shocks.
3.3.1. Hypothesis. The previous section tested for a relationship between country-level
economic growth and polygamy. Here, I test for a more local relationship, investigating
whether rainfall shocks at the survey cluster level predict whether a woman will marry
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polygamously. These shocks operate on both the supply and demand side of the mar-
riage markets. Since many African societies pay bride price rather than dowry, a bad
rainfall shock may encourage a girl’s parents to marry her to a worse man than they oth-
erwise would, in order to smooth consumption. Further, since polygamist men tend be
wealthier, they are better able to buy a wife in a bad year.
3.3.2. Tests. To test this hypothesis, I use OLS to estimate:
polygamyi = βRainfall shock before marriagei + x
′
iγ + δj + ηt + i
Polygamy and the set of controls are defined as in section 2.1, except that I now in-
clude cluster (δj) and year-of-marriage (ηt) or year-of-birth fixed effects in xi. The rain-
fall shock for cluster j is measured as rainfall in year tover average rainfall for that cluster
in the whole panel, i.e. Rainfalljt/Rainfallj . I use two measures of Rainfall shock before
marriage – the rainfall shock in the year a woman is married, and the shock averaged
over her early adolescence, i.e. the years she is aged 12 to 16. Standard errors are clus-
tered by cluster × year of marriage in the first specification, and cluster × year of birth
in the second. As with the tests for GDP growth, year of marriage may be endogenous
and measuring shocks during early adolescence is a crude solution. I reshape the data
into an artificial panel where each woman is observed between the ages of 12 and 25,
and exits on marriage or on turning 26. The dependent variable is now an indicator for
having married polygamously in a given year. I add fixed effects for age, cluster, and year
to xi, excluding other controls (which are completely collinear with these fixed effects).
Standard errors are now clustered by cluster× year.
3.3.3. Data. The only new data introduced here are those on rainfall shocks. These are
the standard University of Delaware data series. Each cluster is joined to the nearest
grid-point in these data.
3.3.4. Results. The results in Table 6 are clear. Across all specifications, a positive rain-
fall shock in a woman’s prime marriageable years predicts that she is less likely to marry
polygamously. Though robust, these effects are small. Raising rainfall by, for example,
100% over its normal value would only have a less than 3 percentage point effect on the
probability a woman marries polygamously. Local economic shocks matter, but they
cannot explain the decline in overall polygamy.
3.4. War.
3.4.1. Hypothesis. Warfare might increase polygamy through several mechanisms. The
most obvious is the sex ratio. Becker (1974) gives, as an example, a nineteenth-century
war that killed most of the male population of Paraguay and was followed by a rise in
AFRICAN POLYGAMY: PAST AND PRESENT 19
TABLE 7. War and polygamy
[Table 7 here]
polygamy. The BBC has suggested that polygamy is a coping strategy for war widows in
Iraq,5 while the OECD has made similar claims about Angola.6 In addition to war’s effect
on the gender ratio, conflict is expected to act like a negative rainfall shock, encouraging
families to marry their daughters to polygamists for cash and protection. Has the falling
incidence of war in Africa (e.g. Blattman and Miguel (2010)) reduced polygamy?
3.4.2. Tests. To test this hypothesis, I use OLS to estimate:
polygamyi = βBattle deaths before marriagei + x
′
iγ + δj + ηt + i
Polygamy and the set of controls are defined as in section 2.1, except that I now in-
clude cluster (δj) and year-of-marriage (ηt) or year-of-birth fixed effects in xi. My mea-
sure of the intensity of conflict is the number of battle-related deaths in a conflict whose
spatial extent includes her survey cluster. I use two measures of Battle deaths before
marriage – the number of deaths in the year a woman is married, and the number of
deaths averaged over her early adolescence, i.e. the years she is aged 12 to 16. Standard
errors are clustered by cluster × year of marriage in the first specification, and cluster
× year of birth in the second. As before, year of marriage may be endogenous, and so I
reshape the data into an artificial panel as in previous sections. Here, each woman is ob-
served between the ages of 12 and 25, and exits on marriage or on turning 26. I estimate
the same equation as above, except that the dependent variable is now an indicator for
having married polygamously in a given year. I add fixed effects for age, cluster, and
year to xi, excluding other controls (which are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects).
Standard errors are now clustered by cluster× year.
3.4.3. Data. The only new data introduced here are the data on battle deaths. These
have been used previously by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011b). These data
are originally from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/International Peace Re-
search Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset. Each conflict in the data is given
a latitude-longitude coordinate, a radius, and a best estimate of the number of battle
deaths in each year of fighting. If the spatial extent of a war overlaps a woman’s survey
cluster in her year of marriage (or early adolescence), she is “treated” by the number of
battle deaths in that war. These are measured in millions of deaths.
3.4.4. Results. The results in Table 7 mirror those for rainfall shocks: war increases the
probability that a woman marries polygamously. This is only apparent from the fixed
effects specification. Otherwise, the fact that many war-prone regions of Africa have
low polygamy rates dominates. Although I take war as a random shock, I am unable
5http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12266986
6http://genderindex.org/country/angola
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FIGURE 3. Polygamy across the Kenya-Tanzania border
This figure plots the average polygamy status of women on either side of the Kenya-Tanzania border as
a function of their distance from that border in kilometers. The solid line is a locally weighted regression
fit, and the grey shaded region is the 95% confidence interval on a quadratic fit.
to rule out the alternative view that war is correlated with local unobservable factors
such as environmental degradation. These results are, however, robust to the inclusion
of local rainfall shocks (not reported). Interpreting the magnitudes here is not obvious,
because of both the units and the range of parameter estimates. A war that kills one
million people would, depending on the specification, raise a woman’s probability of
marrying polygamously by 60 to 550 percentage points. On average, a woman receives
a much smaller shock closer to 1,000 battle deaths in her year of marriage or per year
during her early adolescence. These suggest, as with rainfall shocks, a more modest
effect that cannot explain the overall decline in polygamy.
3.5. National borders.
3.5.1. Hypothesis. Polygamy was banned by law in the Ivory Coast in 1964. From Figure
2 it is clear that polygamy continued to exist into the present. Small sample sizes in the
early years make it impossible to test for a discontinuous break around the year of the
law. A similar ban in Benin in 2004 does not appear to have precipitated a decline in
polygamy rates in 2005 and 2006 (the last years available). Despite the failure of these
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bans, it is possible that national-level policies have affected polygamy on the ground. In
this section, I use a regression discontinuity design to test whether polygamy rates break
at the borders in my sample. Other border studies for Africa (Berger, 2009; Bubb, 2009;
Cogneau et al., 2010; Cogneau and Moradi, 2011) have found that government invest-
ments such as education and health have effects that change discontinuously across
national borders. Similarly, imported institutions such as local government can have
long-lasting border effects. By contrast, indigenous institutions such as the sale and
rental of land tend to vary continuously across national borders.
3.5.2. Tests. For each neighboring set of countries in the data, I pick clusters within 100
km of the border and estimate:
polygamyi = β0 + β1Countryi + f(Distancei) + Countryi × f(Distancei) + x′iγ + i
I adopt the convention that Countryc is a dummy for the alphabetically later country.
In practice, f(Distancei) is a cubic in distance from the border. xi includes year of birth
and its square. Standard errors are clustered at the survey cluster level.
3.5.3. Data. The only new source of data introduced here is the distance from a na-
tional border. Distance from the border was computed by converting country borders
into a finely-spaced set of points and calculating the minimum distance from these
points to the survey cluster.
3.5.4. Results. I report the results of this exercise in Table 8. Visual representations of
the results, mimicking Figure 3, are included in appendix C. It is immediately apparent
that most of the borders do not indicate significant discontinuous changes in polygamy
rates. Of the nine exceptions, a quick inspection of appendix C shows that three should
obviously be discarded as invalid. No clusters were surveyed near the Benin/Burkina
Faso border, and so there is a gap of nearly 20 kilometers on either side of it. A simi-
lar gap exists for the DRC and Tanzania, since much of the border is made up of Lake
Tanganyika. There are too few clusters in the DRC near the CAR border for a regres-
sion polynomial to be estimated with any precision there. Two other discontinuities are
spurious: the two pairs of Guinea/Mali and Niger/Nigeria are both driven by outliers
near the border that inflect the polynomial very close to the border. The estimated dis-
continuity for these two pairs is no longer significant if the regression discontinuity is
estimated as a linear or a quadratic function of distance. By contrast, visual inspection
of the Ghana/Ivory Coast, Kenya/Tanzania, Malawi/Tanzania, and Malawi/Zambia dis-
continuities suggests that these may indeed be legitimate discontinuities. All four of
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these remain significant when estimated with linear or quadratic regression polynomi-
als, excepting Malawi/Zambia, which is not significant in the linear form.
The four effects that exist are large. The Ghana/Ivory Coast break is comparable in
size to the polygamy rate in Ghana, or half the polygamy rate in the Ivory coast. Sim-
ilarly, polygamy nearly doubles at the Malawi-Tanzania and Kenya-Tanzania borders.
The break between Malawi and Zambia is more modest, but is still high relative to a
mean rate of less than 20% in Zambia.
What explains the exceptions? While Bubb (2009) find border discontinuities indi-
cating higher levels of education and numeracy in Ghana, Cogneau et al. (2010) find
instead that several indicators of material well-being break at the border in favor of
the Ivory Coast. Education, then, emerges as a candidate explanation. For each of the
four “legitimate” discontinuities, I perform two checks. First, replacing polygamyi with
years of schoolingi as an outcome variable, I test whether levels of female schooling also
break discontinuously across these borders. Second, I add years of schoolingi as a con-
trol in the regression equation, and test whether it can explain away the border effect
on polygamy. I find significant breaks in years of schooling, favoring Ghana over the
Ivory Coast by a bit more than 4 years and Tanzania over Malawi by roughly two and
a half years (not reported). I find insignificant breaks in favor of Kenya over Tanzania,
and Zambia over Malawi (not reported). Despite these breaks, controlling for education
does not do away with the discontinuity in polygamy in any of the four cases, and has
only a modest effect on the magnitudes (not reported).
3.6. Childmortality.
3.6.1. Hypothesis. Hypothetically, a man’s completed fertility is limited only by his num-
ber of wives, each of whom can only give birth a certain number of times in her lifetime.
If polygamy is a mechanism for men to increase their fertility (e.g. Iliffe (1995); Ter-
tilt (2005)) a reduction in the probability that any one child will die reduces number of
wives needed to achieve a target level of surviving children. Though this effect is offset
by the fact that each wife is now more effective at producing children, the net effect can
be observed by testing responses to changes in the environment for child mortality.
3.6.2. Tests. To test this hypothesis, I use OLS and IV to estimate:
polygamyi = βChild mortality before marriagei + x
′
iγ + δj + ηt + i
Polygamy and the set of controls are as in section 2.1, except that I now include coun-
try (δj) and year (ηt) fixed effects in xi. I use two measures of Child mortality before
marriage – under-5 country-level child mortality in the year a woman is married, and
country-level child mortality averaged over her early adolescence, i.e. the years she is
aged 12 to 16. Standard errors are clustered by country × year of marriage in the first
specification, and country × year of birth in the second. This is the same specification
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used to assess the role of economic growth. I have also implemented similar tests for ris-
ing life expectancy and urbanization, but I have found no impact of either conditional
on year fixed effects. Polygamy is less prevalent in urban, long-surviving countries, but
it is not falling faster in countries that are urbanizing more rapidly, or in which life ex-
pectancy is rising most quickly.
For the same reasons as with GDP per capita, I also reshape the data into an artificial
panel. Each woman is observed between the ages of 12 and 25, and exits on marriage
or on turning 26. I estimate the same equation as above, except that the dependent
variable is now an indicator for having married polygamously in a given year. I include
fixed effects for age, country, and year, excluding other controls. Standard errors are
now clustered by country× year.
There exists, however, a literature suggesting that polygamy may cause greater child
mortality (Strassmann, 1997). Similarly, if polygamy became more costly, men might
respond by investing more in the survival of their children. The reverse causation that
would explain the results, however, is more subtle than this, since child mortality is mea-
sured at the time these women are married, and so this will usually precede their fertility.
To test for a causal relationship, I instrument for country-level child mortality using the
country-level DPT vaccination rates, both in the panel and cross section.
I also replicate a natural experiment from Uganda. In 1960, a joint program between
the WHO and the Government of Uganda eradicated malaria in the country’s Kigezi
region. Following Barofsky et al. (2011), I estimate the effect of this program with the
regression:
polygamyi = βPosti × Kigezii + αKigezii + λPosti + x′iγ + δj + ηt + i
Here, Posti measures whether the respondent was born in 1960 or later, Kigezii is a
dummy for the treated region, xi is as above, δj is a district fixed effect, and ηt is a year-
of-birth fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by district. There are two difficulties
with this approach. First, none of the women in the sample are old enough for treatment
to be measured relative to their year of marriage, rather than their year of birth. Second,
malaria may have had other effects over and above a reduction in the mortality of a
woman’s potential children; Barofsky et al. (2011), for example, use the experiment to
test for educational effects. This results can only provide indirect support of the effect
of a reduction in child mortality.
3.6.3. Data. The only new data introduced here cover child mortality and DPT vacci-
nation rates. Both are taken from the World Development Indicators. Because child
mortality is only reported every five years, it is interpolated linearly for the other years.
For Uganda, “Kigezi” is a dummy for whether the respondent’s survey cluster is in one
of the four present-day districts of Kabale, Kanungu, Kisoro or Rukungiri. In addition to
the DHS sample, I also use the 1991 Ugandan census, available through IPUMS. Because
a woman’s polygamous status is not directly reported in these data, I limit my sample to
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wives of household heads in these data, and record them as polygamous if the house-
hold head is listed as a polygamist. In these data, I follow Barofsky et al. (2011) by also
including indicators for religion, urban status, and ethnicity.
3.6.4. Results. The results, given in Table 9, are strong. In both cross-sectional approaches
and in the IV, excepting the final result in the artificial panel, the elasticity of polygamy
with respect to child mortality is sizable. This is robust to the inclusion of region-round
and cluster-round fixed effects in both cross-sectional approaches (not reported), for
which the magnitudes are similar. The decline in child mortality in Africa since the
1960s has been large in magnitude. Women in the sample have seen child mortality at
their age in marriage fall on average 2 percentage points each decade, while polygamy
has fallen at roughly 6 percentage points a decade. At an elasticity of 0.7 (one of the
conservative estimates), declining child mortality explains roughly one fifth of the de-
cline in polygamy. Critically, the addition of year and country fixed effects shows that
polygamy is declining most rapidly where child mortality is falling fastest, a fact that is
not true for either life expectancy or urbanization.
The results for Uganda are not as robust. The DHS data suggest that women born
after the malaria eradication program were roughly 5 to 8 percentage points less likely
to marry polygamously than those born in other parts of Uganda, relative to women
born in these areas before the treatment. The IPUMS data, however, give more modest
effects, less than 1 percentage point. The significance of these results, however, is sen-
sitive to the clustering used and controls added. Using the IPUMS data tests based on a
woman’s exposure during her prime marriage years rather than at birth. These data sup-
port the view that child mortality matters, but malaria eradication might have reduced
polygamy through several channels, and so they are not dispositive.
3.7. Summary. Beneficial economic shocks and peace both erode polygamy, while the
evidence for economic growth is weak. By contrast, female education in the present
does not seem to matter, at least not in the short run. I fail to find any positive effect of
two natural experiments in school provision on polygamy rates, gains in schooling have
not been sufficient for the raw correlations to explain much of the decline in polygamy,
and discontinuities in female education cannot explain the discontinuously high rates
of polygamy in the Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Malawi relative to their neighbors. Despite
this, years of schooling is strongly correlated with polygamy, while colonial teachers and
Catholic missions both predict lower polygamy rates. Generally, national policies do not
appear to have had an impact on polygamy which, with the above exceptions, does not
differ across national borders. Child mortality, by contrast, can explain a fifth of the
decline in recent decades.
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4. CONCLUSION
I have tested three influential theories about the existence of polygamy, and none
have passed cleanly. Polygamy rates in the present are more related to inequality and
female education in the past than they are to these variables today. The relative distri-
bution of polygamy in Africa cannot be explained by the traditional gender division of
labor. The slave trade remains a plausible explanation of the high prevalence of slavery
in West Africa, and this result survives the inclusion of Angola. However, the slave trade
cannot explain the relative distribution of polygamy within West Africa, and is indistin-
guishable from the simple fact that polygamy rates decline smoothly moving West to
East.
The widespread decline in African polygamy since independence has continued mostly
unhindered by the fits and starts of economic growth. Economic shocks and violence
in a woman’s prime years of marriage increase the probability she will marry polyga-
mously, but the magnitudes of these effects are small. The decline has passed smoothly
over national laws and most national borders. The education of women in Africa has
also advanced in Africa in recent decades, often independent of economic growth. I do
not find any evidence, however, that post-independence natural experiments in school-
ing have had any measurable effect on polygamy. The magnitudes even in the non-
experimental data are not plausible: the educational attainment of women in Africa has
been proceeding too slowly. Countries that have lagged in female schooling, such as
Guinea or the DRC, have seen remarkable declines in polygamy. By contrast, school-
ing in the past that appears to have had a noticeable effect. Polygamy has fallen within
both rural and urban areas, for women who self-declare as “Muslim” or as “Traditional”,
and among those who cannot read. Declining child mortality appears to have played
a substantial role, but still leaves the bulk of the decline unexplained. Existing theories
cannot explain the bulk of the decline of African polygamy, nor can most of the causal
links uncovered here.
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APPENDIX A. DATA APPENDIX
A.1. Principal DHS data. The principal data source for this study is the Demographic
and Health Survey (DHS) data, downloaded from http://www.measuredhs.com/. The
main data are the “individual recodes, ” which are data on a nationally representative
sample of married women between the ages of 15 and 64 for each country.
I use 90 of these datasets for the analysis:
BFIR21FL, BFIR31FL, BFIR43FL, BJIR31FL, BJIR41FL, BJIR51FL, BUIR01FL,
CFIR31FL, CGIR51FL, CIIR35FL, CIIR3AFL, CIIR50FL, CMIR22FL, CMIR31FL,
CMIR44FL, ETIR41FL, ETIR51FL, GAIR41FL, GHIR02FL, GHIR31FL, GHIR41FL,
GHIR4AFL, GHIR5HFL, GNIR41FL, KEIR03FL, KEIR33FL, KEIR3AFL, KEIR41FL,
KEIR51FL, KMIR32FL, LBIR01FL, LBIR51FL, MDIR21FL, MDIR31FL, MDIR41FL,
MDIR51FL, MLIR01FL, MLIR32FL, MLIR41FL, MLIR52FL, MWIR22FL, MWIR41FL,
MWIR4CFL, MZIR31FL, MZIR41FL, MZIR51FL, NGIR21FL, NGIR41FL, NGIR4BFL,
NGIR51FL, NIIR22FL, NIIR31FL, NIIR51FL, NMIR21FL, NMIR41FL, OSIR01FL,
RWIR21FL, RWIR41FL, RWIR53FL, SDIR02FL, SLIR51FL, SNIR02FL, SNIR21FL,
SNIR32FL, SNIR4HFL, TDIR31FL, TDIR41FL, TGIR01FL, TGIR31FL, TZIR21FL,
TZIR3AFL, TZIR4IFL, TZIR51FL, UGIR01FL, UGIR33FL, UGIR41FL, UGIR51FL,
ZAIR31FL, ZMIR21FL, ZMIR31FL, ZMIR42FL, ZMIR51FL, ZWIR31FL, ZWIR42FL,
ZWIR51FL, cdir50fl, gnir52fl, nmir51fl, szir51fl, and tzir4afl.
These include data from 34 countries:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville,
DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagas-
car, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zim-
babwe.
The data include 494,157 observations for which data on polygamy are non-missing.
Of these observations, latitude/longitude coordinates are available for 308,667 in sep-
arate files similarly downloaded from the DHS website. These coordinates are used to
join the data to the other variables listed below. Variables used from the DHS data are:
Respondent’s year of birth is the difference between the survey year (v007) and the
respondent’s age (v012). The survey year required cleaning: adding 1900 if it was less
than 100, recoding 1900 as 2000, 1901 as 2001, 1992 as 2000 for Ethiopia, and 1997 as
2000 for Ethiopia.
Urban is an indicator for whether v025 is “urban.” If v025 was not asked, v102 was
used.
Polygamous is an indicator for whether v505 is greater than 0 if v505 is not missing
and is not 98.
Wealth index is variable v191. To compute the gini coefficient, I re-scaled the index to
be everywhere positive by adding the minimum to all observations (a uniform rightward
shift). Gini coefficients were computed using the fastgini command in Stata.
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Respondent’s partner’s occupation is variable v705.
Years of schooling is variable v133.
Ethnicity is variable v131. This was matched to the ethnic groups in the Ethnographic
Atlas with the help of alternative names on www.ethnologue.com
Religion is variable v130.
A.2. Supplementary DHS data. I use additional DHS data to assess the impact of the
slave trade. The data here are the “household recodes, ” which are household rosters
associated with each of the surveys. In particular, I use 92 of these datasets for the anal-
ysis:
BFHR21FL, BFHR31FL, BFHR43FL, BJHR41FL, BJHR51FL, cdhr50FL,
CFHR31FL, CGHR51FL, CGHR5HFL, CIHR35FL, CIHR50FL, CMHR22FL,
CMHR31FL,CMHR44FL, ETHR41FL, ETHR51FL, GAHR41FL, GHHR31FL,
GHHR41FL, GHHR5HFL, GNHR41FL, gnhr52FL, KEHR33FL,
KEHR3AFL,KEHR41FL, KEHR51FL, KMHR32FL, LBHR5HFL, LSHR41FL,
LSHR60FL, MDHR21FL, MDHR31FL, MDHR41FL, MDHR51FL,
MLHR32FL,MLHR41FL, MLHR52FL, MLHR60FL, MWHR22FL, MWHR41FL,
MWHR4CFL, MZHR31FL, MZHR41FL, MZHR51FL, NGHR21FL,
NGHR41FL, NGHR4BFL,NGHR51FL, NIHR22FL, NIHR31FL, NIHR51FL,
NMHR21FL, NMHR41FL, nmhr51FL, RWHR21FL, RWHR41FL, RWHR53FL,
RWHR5AFL,SLHR51FL, SNHR21FL, SNHR32FL, SNHR4HFL, SNHR50FL,
SNHR5HFL, STHR50FL, szhr51FL, TDHR31FL, TDHR41FL, TGHR31FL, TZHR21FL,
TZHR3AFL, TZHR41FL, tzhr4aFL, TZHR4IFL, TZHR51FL, TZHR60FL, UGHR33FL,
UGHR41FL, UGHR51FL, UGHR5HFL, ZAHR31FL, ZMHR21FL, ZMHR31FL,
ZMHR42FL, ZMHR51FL, ZWHR31FL, ZWHR42FL, ZWHR51FL, BJHR31FL,
CIHR3AFL, GHHR41FL, and LBHR51FL.
From these, I use the variables hv1011 through hv10195 to measure polygamy. I cre-
ate an indicator for polygamy if the household has more than one member listed as a
spouse of the household head, for the sub-sample of households in which there is at
least one spouse.
A.3. FAO-GAEZ data. All of these data are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/
Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm. The variables that I create are.
Suitability for wheat, maize, cereals, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, oil, and cotton are av-
erage suitability for the chosen rain-fed crop, according to plates 29 through 36 of the
FAO’s GAEZ project. This is re-scaled so that larger values indicate greater suitability,
and is (like the other controls) converted to a standard normal variable for the regres-
sions.
Suitability for rain-fed agriculture is plate 46 from the FAO GAEZ data, and measures
the suitability for rain-fed agriculture of any type. Constraints on rain-fed agriculture is
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plate 28 from the FAO GAEZ data, and measures the sum of soil terrain, slope, and cli-
mate constraints on rain-fed agriculture. Ecological zone dummies are computed from
plate 55 of the FAO GAEZ data.
A.4. Other geographic controls. Elevation is average elevation for the ethnic group.
Raster data are provided by the NACIS, downloaded from http://www.naturalearthdata.
com/.
Ruggedness is a measure of terrain ruggedness used by Nunn and Puga (2011). This
measures the elevation distance between a raster cell and its neighbors at a fine level.
The data are downloaded from http://diegopuga.org/data/.
Malaria is suitability for malaria, according to the Malaria Atlas Project, downloaded
from http://www.map.ox.ac.uk/data/.
Historic trade routes are those existing in 600 AD, according to Brice and Kennedy
(2001). I measure distance from these in thousands of kilometers.
Historic population density is made available by the UNEP, at http://na.unep.net/
siouxfalls/datasets/datalist.php. This is measured per square kilometer.
Cluster-level rainfall shocks are made available by the University of Delaware for the
period 1950-1999, at http://climate.geog.udel.edu/~climate/html_pages/archive.
html.
Country-level rainfall shocks are the average of all FAO estimates for grid points within
a country in a given year, computed by Miguel et al. (2004). These are made available on
Edward Miguel’s website, at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/data.shtml.
Country borders are downloaded from http://www.diva-gis.org/.
Cluster-level battle deaths are computed from two data sets, described in consid-
erable detail by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011b). These are all downloaded
from http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/. The first, ConflictSite 4
2006 v2, contains latitude and longitude coordinates and a radius of conflict (in km,
divisible by 50) for all of the wars in the data. Four African wars were missing these,
and so I manually coded them as: Uganda/Tanzania (-1,31.5,150), the Kivu Conflict
(-2.5,28,150), the Tuareg Rebelion (18,6,150) and the Djibouti-Eritrea Border Conflict
(12.71,43,13,50). The second data set, PRIO bd 3.0, contains high, low, and “best” esti-
mates of the number of battle deaths. Where these were missing for the intermediate
years of a specific conflict, I imputed missing values using lags. Where no best estimate
was available, I used the midpoint between the high and low estimates.
Slave trade exposure is computed using the “Murdock ethnic groups” shapefile made
available by Nathan Nunn at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn/data_
nunn. This data source contains his estimates for ethnicity-level slave exports, as well as
a map of these ethnic groups and the area of each ethnic group’s territory.
Distance to Protestant/Catholic mission is computed using the mission locations and
affiliations recorded by Roome (1924).
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Distance from the nearest new world slave port is the minimum distance to Virginia,
Havana, Haiti, Kingston, Dominica, Martinique, Guyana, Salvador, or Rio.
A.5. Ethnographic. This can be downloaded from http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/drwhite/
worldcul/EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav.
Historic class stratification is variable V66, if V66 is not zero or missing. The categories
are: 1, absence among freemen, 2, wealth distinctions, 3, elite, 4, dual, and 5, complex.
Historic slavery is variable V70, if V70 is not zero or missing. The categories are 1, ab-
sence or near absence, 2, incipient or nonhereditary, 3, reported but type not identified,
and 4, hereditary and socially significant.
Historic female agriculture is computed from V54, where I code “males only” as 1,
“males appreciably more” as 2, “differentiated but equal participation” as 3, “equal par-
ticipation” as 3, “female appreciably more” as 4, and “females only” as 5. This is missing
if agriculture is absent or unimportant.
A.6. Data taken from other papers. Three measures of program intensity are taken di-
rectly from the text of Osili and Long (2008) – a dummy variable for a “high intensity”
state, school-building funds in 1976 divided by the 1953 census population estimates,
and school-building funds normalized by 1976 population projections based on the
(unreliable) 1963 census.
These variables used to replicate Huillery (2009) are downloaded from http://econ.
sciences-po.fr/elise-huillery.
A.7. Other variables. Log GDP per capita: These data are taken from the World De-
velopment Indicators and are downloaded from data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
Under-5 child mortality: These data are taken from the World Development Indica-
tors.
DPT vaccination rates: These data are taken from the World Development Indicators.
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APPENDIX B. POLYGAMY RATES OVER TIME
Benin Burkina Faso
Burundi Cameroon
CAR Chad
Comoros Congo
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DRC Ethiopia
Gabon Ghana
Guinea Ivory Coast
Kenya Liberia
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Madagascar Malawi
Mali Mozambique
Namibia Nigeria
Niger Rwanda
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Senegal Sierra Leone
South Africa Sudan
Swaziland Tanzania
Togo Uganda
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Zambia Zimbabwe
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APPENDIX C. DISCONTINUITY RESULTS
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Cluster c.v. of wealth index 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Region c.v. of wealth index -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Cluster gini of wealth index -0.436*** -0.035
(0.043) (0.052)
Region gini of wealth index -0.009 0.188
(0.151) (0.142)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 241,709 172,467 240,656 171,461 241,730 172,482 240,656 171,461
R-squared 0.090 0.144 0.090 0.144 0.091 0.144 0.090 0.144
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd
Clustering Cluster Cluster Region Region Cluster Cluster Region Region
Cluster high/low skill ratio -0.018*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002)
Region high/low skill ratio -0.041*** -0.023
(0.013) (0.015)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 435,846 263,521 464,675 281,248
R-squared 0.002 0.103 0.003 0.104
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. None None None None
Clustering Cluster Cluster Region Region
Historic class stratification 0.031*** 0.029***
(0.012) (0.009)
Historic slavery 0.078** 0.086***
(0.035) (0.025)
Dist. to historic trade routes -0.200*** -0.161***
(0.003) (0.004)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 219,474 148,239 219,474 148,239 308,584 305,051
R-squared 0.008 0.102 0.005 0.101 0.044 0.114
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. None None None None None None
Clustering E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. Cluster Cluster
Log wheat sugar ratio -0.116*** -0.117***
(0.002) (0.009)
Region c.v. of ag. constraints. 0.490*** 0.188***
(0.105) (0.071)
Estimator
Observations 305,051 305,051 314,247 305,051
R-squared 0.031 0.102 0.005 0.101
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. None None None None
Clustering Cluster Cluster Region Region
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Inequality and polygamy
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls are absolute latitude, suitability for wheat, maize, cereals, oil crops, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar,
cotton, and rain-fed agriculture, malaria suitability, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone, unless coefficients on these are reported. Individual controls are year of
birth, year of birth squared, and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Rainfed ag. suit. 0.017*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.002)
Ag. constraints -0.010*** -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Wheat suit. -0.069*** -0.037***
(0.002) (0.002)
Maize suit. 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Cereals suit. 0.022*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002)
Roots and tubers suit. -0.003* -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002)
Pulses suit. -0.009*** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.002)
Sugar suit. 0.016*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002)
Oil suit. -0.030*** -0.028***
(0.002) (0.002)
Cotton suit. 0.004* 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 306,235 305,051 308,584 305,051 305051 305051
R-squared 0.006 0.100 0.001 0.100 0.039 0.100
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. None None None None None None
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Historic female agriculture -0.091*** -0.064*** -0.141*** -0.263*** -0.201***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.080) (0.042)
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV IV
Observations 207,757 139,499 139,499 139,503 139,499
R-squared 0.029 0.105 0.086 -0.076 0.058
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None None Geo./Ind.
F.E. None None None None None
Clustering E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic.
F test 13.19 14.13 15.42
Hansen p 0.0359
Excluded instrument(s) All crops Wheat Suit. Wheat Suit.
Female productivity and polygamy
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls are absolute latitude, suitability for
wheat, maize, cereals, oil crops, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, cotton, and rain-fed agriculture, malaria suitability, ruggedness,
elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone, unless coefficients on these are reported. Individual controls are year of birth,
year of birth squared, and urban.
ln(1+Atlantic slaves/Area), by location 0.042*** 0.026** 0.006 0.028** 0.013
(0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009)
ln(1+Atlantic slaves/Area), by name 0.022 0.005
(0.014) (0.009)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 304,328 300,795 300,795 195,453 129,529 259,506 257,130
R-squared 0.005 0.101 0.123 0.003 0.104 0.005 0.084
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. Longitude None Geo./Ind. None Geo.
F.E. None None None None None None None
Clustering
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
ln(1+Atlantic slaves/Area), by location 0.443*** 0.461*** -0.258 0.285*** 0.245***
(0.111) (0.129) (0.170) (0.062) (0.057)
ln(1+Atlantic slaves/Area), by name 0.290*** 2.981
(0.087) (9.826)
Estimator IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Observations 304,328 300,795 304,328 195,453 129,529 259,506 257,130
R-squared -0.481 -0.344 -0.095 -0.391 -26.112 -0.371 -0.138
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. Longitude None Geo./Ind. None Geo.
F.E. None None None None None None None
Clustering
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
F test 18.60 15.16 2.452 12.67 0.0907 29.33 33.58
Excluded instrument(s) ST distance ST distance ST distance ST distance ST distance ST distance ST distance
The slave trade and polygamy
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls include Absolute latitude, suitability for wheat, maize, cereals, oil
crops, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, cotton, and rain-fed agriculture, malaria suitability, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone, unless
coefficients on these are reported. Individual controls are year of birth, year of birth squared, and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Individual recode Household recode
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Individual recode Household recode
Resp. Education Years -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample All DHS All DHS All DHS All DHS All DHS
Observations 493,829 304,869 304,869 304,869 493,829
R-squared 0.047 0.118 0.151 0.167 0.243
Other cont. None Geog./Indiv. Geog./Indiv. Geog./Indiv. Indiv.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd Region Cluster
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Born 1970-75 X Intensity 0.666* 0.009** 0.031 0.048* 0.000 -0.012
(0.374) (0.004) (0.159) (0.025) (0.000) (0.008)
Born 1970-75 -0.180 -0.327 0.415 -0.108*** -0.095** -0.043
(0.515) (0.606) (0.447) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037)
Intensity -2.611*** -0.009 0.628*** -0.004 0.000 -0.019***
(0.831) (0.005) (0.171) (0.054) (0.000) (0.006)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample
Measure of intensity
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop.
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop.
Observations 9,660 9,660 9,660 9,668 9,668 9,668
R-squared 0.364 0.349 0.376 0.080 0.080 0.085
Other cont. Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long
F.E. None None None None None None
Clustering 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State
14 or below in 1980 1.279*** 0.876*** -0.008 -0.001
(0.200) (0.250) (0.020) (0.025)
Age in 1980 -0.226*** -0.301*** 0.002 0.003
(0.032) (0.051) (0.003) (0.005)
(14-Age in 1980) X Below 14 in 1980 -0.141*** -0.125* -0.002 -0.004
(0.039) (0.076) (0.004) (0.008)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample Zimb. "Full" Zimb. "Short" Zimb. "Full" Zimb. "Short"
Ages in 1980 6 to 22 10 to 20 6 to 22 10 to 20
Measure of intensity High / low Dollars / 1953 Dollars / 1976 High / low
Observations 6,362 3,897 6,367 3,901
R-squared 0.130 0.097 0.002 0.001
Other cont. No No No No
F.E. None None None None
Clustering Robust Robust Robust Robust
Teachers/capita, 1910-1928 -6.749*** -5.678** -10.676*** -8.770** -4.749**
(1.179) (2.271) (2.665) (4.288) (2.138)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample
Observations 98,890 98,890 98,890 98,890 98,890
R-squared 0.001 0.062 0.065 0.063 0.073
Other cont. None None None None None
F.E. None Attractiveness Conquest Precolonial H-Geographic
Clustering District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925
French West Africa
Female education and polygamy
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. (indicated by lists of excluded instruments). Geographic controls are absolute
latitude, suitability for wheat, maize, cereals, oil crops, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, cotton, and rain-fed agriculture, malaria suitability, ruggedness,
elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone, unless coefficients on these are reported. Individual controls are year of birth, year of birth squared,
and urban. Osili/Long controls are year of birth, and dummies for the three largest Nigerian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo), and the major
religions (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other Christian, and traditional). Attractiveness controls are trade taxes in 1914. Conquest controls are date of
conquest, length of resistence and its square, and indemnities in 1910. Precolonial controls are the presence of an ancient state, the presence of a
European trade counter, and 1925 population density. H-Geographic controls are latitude, longitude, altitude, dummies for the river and coast, and
average rainfall from 1915 to 1975.
Dep. Var.: Years of education Dep. Var.: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dep. Var.: Years of education Dep. Var.: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Nigerian women born 1970-75 and 1956-61.
Distance to Catholic mission -5.623*** -4.142*** -1.849*** -3.013***
(0.101) (0.104) (0.152) (0.251)
Distance to Protestant mission -7.152*** -5.280*** -1.426*** -2.599***
(0.112) (0.104) (0.120) (0.212)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 308,397 304,869 304,869 304,869 308,397 304,869 304,869 304,869
R-squared 0.077 0.262 0.383 0.429 0.112 0.276 0.382 0.428
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Ind. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd Region None None Cntry-rnd Region
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Distance to Catholic mission 0.201*** 0.122*** 0.069*** 0.171***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.027)
Distance to Protestant mission 0.241*** 0.113*** -0.043*** 0.031
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.025)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 308,584 305,051 305,051 305,051 308,584 305,051 305,051 305,051
R-squared 0.008 0.102 0.143 0.161 0.010 0.102 0.143 0.161
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Ind.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd Region None None Cntry-rnd Region
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls are absolute latitude, suitability for wheat, maize, cereals, oil
crops, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, cotton, and rain-fed agriculture, malaria suitability, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone, unless
coefficients on these are reported. Individual controls are year of birth, year of birth squared, and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Years of education
Missions and polygamy
Ln GDP per capita: Age of marriage -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.187** -0.813
(0.005) (0.005) (0.079) (0.779)
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 448,195 280,146 330,864 198,486
R-squared 0.001 0.141 -0.061 -0.067
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
FE None Y.O.M./Country None Y.O.M./Country
Clustering Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M.
F test 15.37 1.182
Ln GDP per capita: Ages 12-16 -0.020*** -0.007 -0.220*** 1.414
(0.006) (0.005) (0.059) (2.469)
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 422,763 267,487 328,062 201,092
R-squared 0.001 0.137 -0.089 -0.705
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. None Y.O.B./Country None Y.O.B./Country
Clustering Country x Y.O.B. Country x Y.O.B. Country x Y.O.B. Country x Y.O.B.
F test 31.49 0.352
Ln GDP Per Capita -0.007*** 0.001** -0.066*** -0.094
(0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.137)
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 2,779,853 2,779,853 2,249,635 2,249,635
R-squared 0.001 0.028 -0.045 0.006
Other cont. None None None None
F.E. Age/Year/Country Age/Year/Country Age/Year/Country Age/Year/Country
Clustering Country x Year Country x Year Country x Year Country x Year
F test 12.63 0.521
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. (indicated by lists of excluded instruments). Geographic controls are
absolute latitude, suitability for wheat, maize, cereals, oil crops, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, cotton, and rain-fed agriculture, malaria suitability,
ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone, unless coefficients on these are reported. Individual controls are year of birth, year
of birth squared, and urban. The excluded instrument in all IV regressions is the country-level rainfall estimate reported by Miguel, Satyanath,
and Sergenti, E. (2004).
Dependent variable: Polygamous (Cross Section)
Economic growth and polygamy
Dependent variable: Polygamous (Cross Section)
Dependent variable: Polygamous (Artificial panel)
Rainfall shock: Age of marriage -0.113*** -0.027***
(0.005) (0.004)
Rainfall shock: Ages 12-16 -0.251*** -0.040***
(0.009) (0.008)
Rainfall shock -0.023*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 259,337 259,337 275,770 275,770 1,727,297 1,727,297
R-squared 0.002 0.257 0.003 0.258 0.000 0.063
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None None
F.E. None
Y.O.M. / 
Cluster None Y.O.B. / Cluster None Year / Cluster
Clustering
Cluster x 
Y.O.M.
Cluster x 
Y.O.M.
Country x 
Y.O.B. Cluster x Y.O.B. Cluster x Year Cluster x Year
Economic shocks and polygamy
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Cross Section Artificial Panel
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls include absolute latitude, suitability for wheat, maize, cereals,
oil crops, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, cotton, and rain-fed agriculture, malaria suitability, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone,
unless coefficients on these are reported. Individual controls are year of birth, year of birth squared, and urban.
Battle deaths: Age of marriage -5.541*** 0.615***
(0.134) (0.138)
Battle deaths: Ages 12-16 -9.904*** 1.260***
(0.199) (0.217)
Battle deaths -0.866*** 0.095***
(0.024) (0.026)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 308,070 308,070 307,791 307,791 1,893,780 1,893,780
R-squared 0.004 0.254 0.006 0.253 0.000 0.062
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None None
F.E. None Cluster/Y.O.M. None Cluster/Y.O.B. Age/Year/Cluster Age/Year/Cluster
Clustering Cluster x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.B. Cluster x Y.O.B. Cluster x Year Cluster x Year
War and polygamy
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Cross Section Artificial Panel
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. (indicated by lists of excluded instruments). Geographic controls include absolute latitude, suitability for wheat,
maize, cereals, oil crops, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, cotton, and rain-fed agriculture, malaria suitability, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone, unless coefficients
on these are reported. Individual controls are year of birth, year of birth squared, and urban.
Benin and 
Burkina Faso
Benin and 
Niger
Benin and 
Nigeria
Benin and 
Togo
Burkina Faso 
and Ghana
Burkina Faso 
and Ivory 
Coast
Burkina Faso 
and Niger
Burkina Faso 
and Mali
Burkina Faso 
and Togo
CAR and 
Cameroon CAR and DRC
Cameroon and 
Nigeria
DRC and 
Rwanda
Border 0.849** 0.091 0.035 -0.030 0.123 -0.181 0.103 0.018 -0.014 0.122* -0.074*** -0.197 0.023
(0.385) (0.084) (0.139) (0.051) (0.080) (0.123) (0.134) (0.082) (0.105) (0.069) (0.022) (0.122) (0.035)
Obs 1,605 1,375 9,217 14,855 5,503 1,803 3,857 11,148 2,603 1,255 1,924 7,198 5,441
R-sq 0.056 0.111 0.078 0.054 0.069 0.042 0.074 0.061 0.029 0.040 0.018 0.029 0.020
DRC and 
Tanzania
DRC and 
Uganda
DRC and 
Zambia
Ethiopia and 
Kenya
Ghana and 
Ivory Coast
Ghana and 
Togo
Guinea and 
Ivory Coast
Guinea and 
Liberia
Guinea and 
Mali
Guinea and 
Senegal
Ivory Coast 
and Liberia
Ivory Coast 
and Mali
Kenya and 
Tanzania
Border -13.163*** -0.142 -0.065 0.132 -0.238*** 0.010 -0.301 -0.010 0.207* -0.243 -0.050 0.064 0.176*
(1.358) (0.174) (0.049) (0.113) (0.089) (0.043) (0.354) (0.089) (0.114) (0.207) (0.075) (0.146) (0.095)
Obs 925 3,210 1,665 470 3,957 11,518 2,145 4,458 4,628 2,126 4,000 3,380 4,909
R-sq 0.014 0.023 0.023 0.067 0.057 0.056 0.073 0.048 0.077 0.107 0.022 0.082 0.029
Kenya and 
Uganda
Malawi and 
Mozambique
Malawi and 
Tanzania
Malawi and 
Zambia Mali and Niger
Mali and 
Senegal
Mozambique 
and Tanzania
Mozambique 
and Zambia
Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe
Niger and 
Nigeria
Rwanda and 
Tanzania
Rwanda and 
Uganda
Zambia and 
Zimbabwe
Border -0.129 0.033 0.196*** 0.118* 0.268 0.066 -5.122 0.000 -0.232 -0.122** 0.015 -0.027 -0.111
(0.099) (0.064) (0.057) (0.065) (0.236) (0.104) (3.163) (0.000) (0.222) (0.060) (0.094) (0.048) (0.118)
Obs 3,362 16,673 3,027 7,019 887 2,208 1,678 574 2,875 12,252 4,448 5,433 1,639
R-sq 0.071 0.028 0.065 0.034 0.094 0.111 0.051 0.043 0.017 0.049 0.016 0.029 0.084
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS, with polygyny as the dependent variable and standard errors clustered at the survey cluster level. Other controls are a cubic in distance to the
border, interacted with a country dummy, and a quadratic in respondent age. The coefficient reflects the jump from moving to the alphabetically prior country.
National bordersand polygamy
Child mortality: Age of marriage 1.596*** 0.756*** 2.345*** 0.933*
(0.053) (0.092) (0.205) (0.528)
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 474,553 290,202 327,124 209,634
R-squared 0.044 0.142 0.009 0.109
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
FE None Y.O.M./Country None Y.O.M./Country
Clustering Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M.
F test 217.7 28.95
Child mortality: Ages 12-16 1.570*** 1.038*** 2.215*** 0.730**
(0.056) (0.095) (0.223) (0.355)
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 456,024 286,453 241,589 164,921
R-squared 0.041 0.138 0.005 0.097
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. None Y.O.B./Country None Y.O.B./Country
Clustering Country x Y.O.B. Country x Y.O.B. Country x Y.O.B. Country x Y.O.B.
F test 147.4 107.8
Child mortality 0.255*** 0.103*** 0.452*** -0.279**
(0.010) (0.023) (0.038) (0.134)
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 2,984,448 1,825,936 1,875,666 1,221,446
R-squared 0.006 0.038 0.001 0.033
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. Age/Year/Country Age/Year/Country Age/Year/Country Age/Year/Country
Clustering Country x Year Country x Year Country x Year Country x Year
F test 157.3 36.38
Kigezi X Post (birth) -0.050 -0.076* -0.006* -0.007**
(0.035) (0.040) (0.003) (0.003)
Kigezi -0.082* -0.239 -0.020** 0.033***
(0.045) (0.143) (0.007) (0.007)
Post (birth) -0.064** 0.139 0.009*** 0.124**
(0.025) (0.129) (0.003) (0.057)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 8,740 8,422 182,714 182,553
R-squared 0.006 0.087 0.063 0.067
Other cont. None Geo./Ind. Rel/Urb/Eth Rel/Urb/Eth
F.E. None Y.O.B./Dist. None Y.O.B./Dist.
Clustering District District District District
Child mortality and polygamy (country level)
Dependent variable: Polygamous (Cross Section)
Dependent variable: Polygamous (Cross Section)
Dependent variable: Polygamous (Artificial panel)
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. (indicated by lists of excluded instruments). Geographic controls are
absolute latitude, suitability for wheat, maize, cereals, oil crops, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, cotton, and rain-fed agriculture, malaria suitability,
ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone, unless coefficients on these are reported. Individual controls are year of birth, year
of birth squared, and urban. The excluded instrument in all IV regressions is the country-level rainfall estimate reported by Miguel, Satyanath,
and Sergenti, E. (2004).
Dependent variable: Polygamous (Uganda only)
DHS IPUMS
